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The Environmental, Democratic, and Rule-of-Law Implications of Harper’s Environmental
Assessment Legacy
Jocelyn Stacey1
Introduction
Canada’s leading environmental law scholars have identified Harper’s legacy as a fullscale attack on the environment,2 one that simultaneously diminished the federal government’s
role in environmental protection and sought to increase federal influence over resource
development. Indeed, the list of measures and actions taken by the Harper government that
undermine environmental protection is striking: The federal role in conducting environmental
assessment was radically reduced3 as was its role in protecting navigable waters.4 Fisheries
protections were narrowed. 5 New regulation-making authority was exempt from ordinary
procedural requirements, for no apparent reason. 6 Ocean dumping controls were relaxed. 7
Critical habitat requirements for species at risk were loosened.8 The government systemically
failed to develop recovery strategies for species at risk, contrary to legislative requirements.9
The government formally withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol10 and repealed the Kyoto Protocol
Implementation Act.11 The authority to deny interprovincial pipeline approvals was moved from
1
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the National Energy Board to federal Cabinet.12 The National Roundtable on Environment and
Economy, a government advisory body on sustainable development, was disbanded. 13
Environmental non-governmental organizations were targeted for auditing on their charitable
status.14 The Experimental Lakes Area, a world-class research facility, was defunded.15 Library
materials from Fisheries and Oceans Canada were destroyed.16 The RCMP and CSIS engaged in
coordinated, covert surveillance of peaceful activities by environmental and Indigenous
groups. 17 Government scientists were muzzled. 18 The budgets for Environment Canada and
Fisheries and Oceans were slashed.19
Collectively these measures result in a radical reduction of the federal government’s
role in environmental protection. They appear to reflect an assumption of a zero-sum trade-off
between resource development and environmental protection. Others have argued they are
part of a concerted effort to subsume “the environment” under “a singular resource extraction
paradigm.”20 The argument advanced here is that that the precise changes to environment law
not only reflect this substantive vision of the environment, they also represent an attempt to
exempt environmental decisions from the requirements of the rule of law. Underlying this
argument is the premise that a democratic government committed to the rule of law must
publicly justify its decisions on the basis of core constitutional principles, such as fairness and
12
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reasonableness. This rule-of-law requirement is most clearly reflected in section 1 of the
Charter, but is also the core commitment contained within our common law constitution,
realized, in part, through the courts’ administrative law function of judicial review.21
The obligation to give publicly-regarding reasons (i.e. reasons that are not solely selfinterested and that can be accepted by others) is also the consensus point amongst theorists of
deliberative democracy, who espouse “an ideal of politics where people routinely relate to one
another… by influencing each other through the publicly valued use of reasoned argument,
evidence, evaluation and persuasion.”22 Thus the requirement of public justification lies at the
intersection of the rule of law and deliberative democracy.23 Public justification takes seriously
the capacity of legal subjects—those subject to the law—to “reason with the law.”24 It both
respects and enables individual autonomy by protecting legal subjects from arbitrary decisionmaking and also facilitating their participation in the ongoing project of contesting (or not) and
deliberating upon the content of the law. On this view, individual participation is inherent within
legal authority.
The crux of this article is that environmental assessment law provides an essential
framework for publicly-justified decision-making in the Canadian environmental context. This
means that the Harper-led changes to environmental assessment can be understood as an
attempt to exempt environmental decision-makers from the basic requirements of a democratic
conception of the rule of law. The article focuses specifically on environmental assessment law,
rather than a broader suite of Harper’s environmental measures, for several reasons. Rewriting
Canadian environmental assessment legislation was a cornerstone of the Harper government’s
environmental legacy. It was a comprehensive change to a single piece of legislation that nicely
captures the Harper vision of a narrow federal role, a narrow understanding of environmental
protection, and a capitulation to the federal government’s resource development agenda.
Furthermore, environmental assessment laws are often thought of as the “mainframe of
environmental law.”25 Indeed, as I suggest in this article, environmental assessment presently
performs a quasi-constitutional role in Canadian environmental decision-making in the sense
that it provides an indispensable framework for public justification.
The article argues that Harper’s dramatic changes to federal environmental assessment
give rise to a two-dimensional legacy in environmental law: first, a legacy of impoverished
21
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environmental decision-making that reflects a narrow, resource-oriented vision of the
environment, and second, a legacy of undermining democratic and rule-of-law values in
environmental law. This argument unfolds through three parts. The first part introduces the
basic structure, purpose and practice of environmental assessment. It argues that
environmental assessment is best understood as providing a framework for public justification
in environmental decision-making. And it identifies how a misunderstanding of this justificatory
function paved the way for criticism—from all sides—of Canadian environmental assessment
law. The second part introduces Harper’s major changes to Canadian environmental
assessment. Drawing on existing literature, it argues that one aspect of the changes is poorer
environmental decisions. The reduction in the scope and rigour of environmental assessment in
Canada leaves our public decision-makers less informed about the environmental effects of
their decisions. The third part extends on this existing environmental commentary. It argues that
the changes to federal environmental assessment undermine the federal government’s ability to
offer adequate justification for its environmental decision, and thus suggest an attempt to
exempt the government from the ongoing project of democratic governance under the rule of
law. The article concludes by observing that Harper’s legacy in environmental law has created
significant challenges for reinstating and then coordinating robust environmental assessment in
the Trudeau era.

I.

Environmental Assessment: Publicly Justifying Environmental Decisions

Environmental assessment is the practice of studying, understanding and attempting to predict
the potential environmental effects of certain activities (e.g. developing a new mine) before
deciding whether these activities are allowed to proceed. It formalizes the common sense
notion that we ought to ‘look before we leap’. The Supreme Court of Canada has described
environmental assessment as “a planning tool that is now generally regarded as an integral
component of sound decision-making.”26 What these benign descriptions belie, however, is the
fact that environmental assessment carries the weight of much of the hope and expectation for
environmental law more generally. Environmental assessment is intended to promote
sustainable development,27 facilitate consultation with aboriginal peoples, coordinate decisionmaking between levels of government, and encourage public participation.28 But it is also an
attempt to regularize and channel that which cannot easily be tamed. The very nature of
environmental assessment brings to the surface heated debates about nature and natural
26
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resources, environmental protection and development, and scientific, Indigenous and all other
ways of understanding our relationships with each other and the environment.
In broad strokes, environmental assessment is generally comprised of anticipation,
participation and the determination of whether a proposal is likely to cause significant adverse
environmental effects. Environmental assessment requires gathering information about the
project and its possible effects in order to anticipate the environmental consequences of
approving the project. It typically includes some form of public participation, which incorporates
information from a range of sources. The extent and depth of the assessment varies with the
nature of the proposed project. Major development proposals attract more rigorous
assessments than minor proposals. The end result of the assessment is a determination of
whether the proposal is likely to cause significant adverse environmental effects, and if so,
whether the project can nonetheless be justified. 29 Because of this final determination,
environmental assessment does not require decision-makers to reach any particular outcome
(i.e. even projects with significant negative effects may be justified and then approved). For this
reason, environmental assessment is often characterized as essentially procedural in nature.30
At the same time, however, environmental assessment serves (or ought to serve) underlying
substantive objectives by providing a forum for explicitly considering whether the risks of
projects are acceptable and whether proposals reflect the best use of our land and resources.31
Often these processes lead to modifications in the project design and the incorporation of
mitigating conditions intended to prevent and reduce anticipated environmental harm.32
Environmental assessment can also be understood as providing a framework for publicly
justifying environmental decisions on the basis of underlying constitutional principles of fairness
and reasonableness. The participatory component of environmental assessment – i.e. noticeand-comment or public hearings – creates the opportunity for those affected by the decision to
be heard, analogous to the administrative law requirement of procedural fairness. At the same
time, the assessment can generate a robust pool of information that provides a reasoned basis
for the decision-maker’s determination of whether a project ought to proceed and on what
conditions. In the Canadian context, one need not look further than the language of the
Canadian Environmental Assessment Act 2012 (CEAA 2012) to see that environmental
assessment ought to perform a justificatory role. Where a project is likely to result in significant
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adverse environmental effects, section 52(4) requires the Governor in Council to decide whether
those effects “are justified in the circumstances.”33
Environmental assessment legislation is distinct from other environmental statutes and
regulations in that it “is a planning tool, not a regulatory tool.”34 The distinction is one of both
timing and purpose: environmental assessment happens at an early stage in order to consider
the need, alternatives, and design of the project. In contrast, environmental regulation governs
the operation of the project. There is an additional and significant distinction, at least in the
Canadian context, in that environmental regulatory decisions do not, at present, fulfill the ruleof-law requirement of public justification. Regulatory decisions at the federal level (e.g. issuing
pollution permits, or authorizations to destroy fish habitat) are not, generally speaking,
transparent, publicly accessible, reasoned, or subject to any meaningful form of review.35 This
means that, in Canada, environmental assessment is the primary means by which the federal
government meets its rule-of-law obligation to publicly justify its environmental decisions.
Environmental assessment can thus be understood as having a quasi-constitutional role because
it provides the means through which the government can fulfill its constitutional obligation to
govern according to the rule of law.
The courts, however, have largely overlooked this justificatory function and have
instead viewed environmental assessment in largely technical and formal terms. The first
Supreme Court of Canada decision on environmental assessment upheld an expansive role for
the federal government in conducting environmental assessment, even when predicted
environmental effects pertained to matters of provincial jurisdiction. 36 At the same time,
however, the Supreme Court emphasized the essentially procedural nature of environmental
assessment. Indeed a key distinction for the Court, between environmental assessment and
regulation (such as the Fisheries Act) was that the former “is fundamentally procedural while the
other is substantive in nature.”37 The Federal Court of Appeal has a long history of narrowly
interpreting the requirements of environmental assessment legislation. Prominent decisions
include deference to federal decision-makers narrowly “scoping” the proposed project to
include only features requiring federal approval (e.g. the bridge crossing fish habitat, not the
33
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entire logging operation),38 and holding that an assessment will be unreasonable only if the
decision-maker “gave no consideration at all to [the] environmental effects.”39 More recently,
the Federal Court upheld as reasonable the Governor in Council’s determination that the effects
of the Site C Dam were “justified in the circumstances,” despite the fact the decision did not
explain in any fashion the basis for that conclusion.40
Construed as a formal pre-approval exercise, rather than a rule-of-law imperative,
environmental assessment is easily vulnerable to criticism. Environmental groups argue that it is
toothless and unmoored from advancing underlying substantive environmental goals.41 Industry
highlights its ineffectiveness at achieving environmental outcomes and argues that
environmental assessment is wasteful, burdensome and leads to costly delays to
development.42 Joe Oliver, the Minister of Natural Resources at the time of the changes to
federal environmental assessment law, stated “[u]nfortunately, our inefficient, duplicative and
unpredictable regulatory system is an impediment [to diversifying Canada’s markets]. It is
complex, slow-moving and wasteful. It subjects major projects to unpredictable and potentially
endless delays.”43 The stage was set for Harper’s environmental assessment legacy.

II.

The Legacy Part I: Impoverished Environmental Decisions

Harper’s changes to the federal environmental assessment occurred in two waves. First the
2010 Budget Implementation Bill (Bill C-9) amended the Canadian Environmental Assessment
Act (CEAA) to increase the discretionary powers of Ministers conducting environmental
assessments 44 and to streamline various procedures. 45 In addition, the bill exempted from
environmental assessment all infrastructure projects contained in the stimulus package for
responding to the financial crisis.46 The timing of these changes was odd because they coincided
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with the Act’s legislated 7-year review.47 It turned out that these changes were only a precursor
to a second wave of changes that ushered in the complete reshaping of federal environmental
assessment in 2012. After an abridged legislative review, conducted over only a few weeks by
the Standing Committee on Environment and Sustainable Development, the repeal of CEAA and
enactment of CEAA 2012 were proposed in the 2012 Budget Implementation Bill (Bill C-38).
After only two months in the House of Commons and the rejection of all proposed amendments
to CEAA 2012 provisions, Bill C-38 was passed in June 2012. Later in the same year, Bill C-45
introduced additional changes to CEAA 2012, increasing the amount of discretion delegated to
decision-makers under the Act.48
The previous version of CEAA was by no means perfect.49 But the 2012 changes to
environmental assessment are a dramatic retreat in the face of strong international trends and
academic commentary in favour of a gradually expanding role for environmental assessment in
terms of proposals considered, public participation and the objectives served.50 For example,
experience with project-specific environmental assessment revealed the need for strategic
environmental assessment of higher-level policy and programmatic decisions in order to assess
social and environmental effects systematically rather than through a piecemeal, project-byproject approach.51
In contrast to this trend of inclusivity, Harper’s rewriting of federal environmental
assessment created a highly exclusive assessment regime. This part focuses on three major ways
in which federal environmental assessment was narrowed. 52 First, the Act substantially reduces
the number of projects that require an environmental assessment. Second, the Act defines
environmental effects narrowly to only include some effects within federal jurisdiction. Third,
the Act reduces the role for public participation in environmental assessment. The legacy of
these changes is impoverished public decision-making, which is now less informed by potential
impacts on the environment.

47
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Only projects that are specifically designated by regulations are subject to CEAA 2012’s
environmental assessment requirements, subject to the residual discretion of the Minister of
the Environment to order an environmental assessment for a project not otherwise
designated.53 However, even designated projects can be exempt from a federal environmental
assessment if they undergo an equivalent provincial assessment. 54 The previous legislation
essentially required an assessment for any project that required the exercise of federal authority
(e.g. an approval from Fisheries and Oceans to alter fish habitat). 55 The default under the
previous legislation, in other words, was that a project was included in the regime, unless it was
specifically excluded. 56 In contrast, CEAA 2012 reverses this default rule; only projects
specifically designated as “in” potentially require federal assessment.57
CEAA 2012 further narrows the role of environmental assessment by requiring the
Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency (CEA Agency) to make an initial decision about
whether any designated project in fact requires an assessment.58 Even designated projects may
not require an assessment as a result of a summary determination that they will not cause
significant, adverse environmental effects. This mechanism, in other words, contradicts the very
purpose of environmental assessment by assuming that a decision-maker is able to confidently
determine in advance, and without the benefit of an actual assessment, which projects are likely
to cause significant environmental harm.
The result has been a striking reduction in the number of federal environmental
assessments conducted each year. The immediate effect of CEAA 2012 was to cancel
approximately 3,000 ongoing assessments. 59 Since then, the number of completed federal
environmental assessments has dropped from over 6,000 annually under the previous
legislation60 to only about a dozen each year.61 This is because the lowest level of assessment, a
“screening” which accounted for approximately 99% of assessments under the prior regime,62

53
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was eliminated by CEAA 2012. When a project is determined to require an assessment under
CEAA 2012, it now proceeds either through a standard “assessment”63 or a “panel review.”64
Second, CEAA 2012 redefines the “environmental effects” to be considered in an
environmental assessment. The previous legislation defined environmental effects broadly to
include “any change that the project may cause in the environment.”65 The courts have held
that it was constitutionally permissible for federal departments to consider environmental
effects even when those effects were subjects of provincial jurisdiction.66 In contrast, CEAA 2012
defines environmental effects only as some components of the environment within federal
jurisdiction (e.g. fish and fish habitat, migratory birds, changes to federal lands, effects on
aboriginal peoples).67 The definition of environmental effects “covers only a small fraction of the
interconnected biophysical effects that are included in the minimum usual scope of
environmental assessments globally.”68 The effect of such a change is that the federal decisionmaker must now base his/her decision on a restricted understanding of environmental effects.
In light of the specificity of the effects considered, it is much less likely that the decision-maker
will make a finding of significant adverse environmental effects.69 It is further unlikely that such
a narrow understanding of environmental effects can provide a sufficient basis for determining
whether a project can be justified in the circumstances.70 As a result, only a joint environmental
assessment by the province and federal government has the potential to result in a fulsome
assessment of a proposal’s environmental effects.
CEAA 2012 has extensive implications for public participation. The most significant
change is the reduction in the number of environmental assessments, which removes
consideration of these project proposals from the public sphere. Under the previous legislation,
projects subject to screenings at least required online, publicly-accessible records of the project
and assessment.71 Since the vast majority of these projects no longer fall under the scope of
federal environmental assessment, there is no public notice of the proposal. And it is not safe to
assume that provincial environmental assessment regimes will fill in these gaps, as the
63
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application of provincial legislation can also be quite narrow.72 For projects subject to CEAA 2012
requirements, public participation is constrained by tight legislated timelines. For example, the
public only has 20 days to comment on whether a designated project should be assessed under
the Act.73 While projects that undergo an assessment are subject to public notice-and-comment
requirements,74 CEAA 2012 narrowly redefines a class of participant, the “interested party.”75
Only if an individual is an interested party, that is “directly affected…[or] has relevant
information or expertise,”76 is she/he entitled to full participation in a panel review.
The benefits of public participation in environmental assessment have been widely
noted. Historically, public participants have proven to be the “most motivated and often most
effective in ensuring careful and critical review of project proposals and associated
environmental assessment work.” 78 Local knowledge and citizen concerns are an important
counterbalance to the fact that the proponent is otherwise the sole source of information about
the effects of the proposed project.
77

The massive reduction in public participation under CEAA 2012 will lead to poorer
environmental decisions, but it also sends a strong signal about whose interests really matter in
Harper’s vision of the environment. The changes disproportionately undermine Indigenous
participation, groups who are often the most closely affected by development projects, and who
often already face substantial barriers to participation due to remote locations and/or lack of
resources and capacity to effectively intervene.79 Moreover, CEAA 2012 excludes or marginalizes
individuals and groups with issue-specific concerns, such as climate change.80 The result is that
environmental decisions are based on skewed understandings of the possible environmental
effects of a project, and have led to “a collapse in the role of formal decision-making processes
as mechanisms for producing decisions which are seen as legitimate and therefore likely to win
72
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acceptance among the affected parties.”81 The formal decision-making processes, contrary to
their original purpose, become yet another source of controversy and dispute.
In sum, the extent of the changes made to federal environmental assessment have leading
commentators now arguing that what remains no longer counts as environmental assessment.82
According to Doelle, the new regime simply gathers “information already required for existing
federal regulatory decisions”83 Similarly, Gibson notes that the new Act “positions assessment as
a post-planning regulatory hoop inevitably under pressure for speedy decisions that do not
require substantial changes to the established plans.” 84 The Act, in his view, “gets its
streamlining chiefly by undermining effectiveness.”85 The result, in other words, is a legacy of
public decision-making that does not, in any robust way, attempt to anticipate the
environmental consequences of the exercise of public authority.

III.

The Legacy Part II: Eroding the Commitment to a Democratic Conception of the
Rule of Law

Harper’s legacy in environmental assessment is more fundamental than poorly-informed
environmental decisions; it is also a legacy of undermining Canada’s commitment to governing
under a democratic conception of the rule of law. This part extends on existing critiques of CEAA
2012 in three ways. First, it argues that informed decisions and public participation are internal
to a democratic conception of the rule of law, at least when we understand the rule of law in a
more demanding sense than minimal compliance with a statutory norm. Second, it argues that,
because of the special quasi-constitutional role of environmental assessment law in enabling
public justification, the changes to federal environmental assessment ought to be understood as
an attempt to exempt environmental decision-making from the requirements of the rule of law.
Third, reframing existing critiques of CEAA 2012 in rule-of-law terms provides a basis for
understanding the ongoing obligations of our public institutions with respect to the deficient
legislation.
The rule of law, as is often noted, is an “essentially contested concept.” 86 The
conception of the rule of law advanced here is the idea that public officials must publicly justify
their decisions on the basis of core constitutional principles. It is a conception elaborated by
Dyzenhaus, who states that its basic content is that
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legislation must be capable of being interpreted in such a way that it can be enforced in
accordance with the requirements of due process: the officials who implement it can
comply with a duty to act fairly, reasonably and in a fashion that respects the equality of
all those who are subject to the law and independent judges are entitled to review the
decisions of these officials to check that they do so comply.87
This understanding of the rule of law is a version of common law constitutionalism, which posits
that the common law is a source of deep-seated principles that are refined over time through
the practice of giving reasons. Two of these common law principles are fairness and
reasonableness, which are expressed through basic administrative law requirements enforced
by judicial review. Together they give rise to an obligation on public officials to publicly justify
their decisions on the basis of these principles. That is, public officials must demonstrate that
their decisions are both fair and reasonable.
The requirement of public justification has been repeatedly, though imperfectly,
identified by the Supreme Court of Canada. The fullest expression of a requirement of public
justification was by the Court in Baker, which imposed an obligation on administrative officials,
in some instances, to offer reasons for their decisions that demonstrate that they exercised
discretion in accordance with core principles of Canadian law.88 The Court’s watershed decision
in Dunsmuir later highlighted the role of reasonableness review in ensuring “justification,
transparency and intelligibility within the decision-making process.”89
These core common law principles are constitutional in the sense that they are
constitutive of law. In Dyzenhaus’s words, “you cannot have rule by law without rule of law.”90
Put differently, it is compliance with the rule of law (i.e. public justification on the basis of
common law principles) that gives a public decision the quality of law. Legislation that conforms
to Fuller’s well-known indicia of the rule of law (publicity, generality, prospectivity, etc) is the
first step in complying with the requirement of public justification because it puts the
implementation of the legislation under the supervision of the courts. When a would-be
lawmaker fails to comply with the rule of law, as in the case of Fuller’s allegorical King Rex,91 she
fails to make law. And when a legislature attempts to exempt government action from judicial
supervision, by for example clearly and explicitly suspending the application of basic due process
requirements, such a law may be valid but it lacks the quality of law that gives it its legal
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authority.92 On this view, the rule of law requires, not only that legislation possesses formal ruleof-law features, it also requires that whenever and however that legislation comes into contact
with the lives of individuals, its implementation is publicly justified.
The rule of law, on this view, is constitutive of a particular relationship between legal
subject, the individual subject to the law, and lawmaker. Compliance with the rule of law means
law is in a form that legal subjects can understand, deliberate upon and contest on the basis
that it does not reflect core constitutional principles. It allows, in other words, individuals to
“reason with the law.”93 Importantly, however, this conception of the rule of law can only be
realized within a deliberative democracy,94 in which individuals expect every exercise of power
to be justified and “in which leadership given by government rests on the cogency of the case
offered in defence of its decisions, not the fear inspired by the force at its command.”95 It is
therefore a democratic conception of the rule of law because individual participation is
simultaneously essential to its realization and enabled by its fulfillment.
The public-justification conception of the rule of law imposes on environmental
decision-makers obligations to demonstrate that their decisions are reasonable and fair.96 In
other words, reasonable, informed environmental decisions that are procedurally fair to those
affected are requirements of the rule of law. When environmental decisions comply with these
requirements they have the authority of law. 97 From this perspective, environmental
assessment performs a quasi-constitutional role in the sense that environmental assessment,
when it enables public participation and generates reasoned decisions, is constitutive of legal
authority in environmental law. Recall that this is, at present, a unique role, because the vast
majority of federal environmental decision-making is not meaningfully subject to the rule-of-law
requirements of fairness and reasonableness.
We are now in position to see how the extensive changes to federal environmental
assessment law not only undermine environmental protection; they can also be interpreted as
an attempt to exempt environmental decision-making from the fundamental rule-of-law
requirement of public justification. The clearest evidence of this exemption from public
92
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justification is that the vast majority of federal environmental decisions now proceed without
having first undergone a federal environmental assessment. The result is that these decisions
are made with minimal legal constraints on environmental decision-makers. Permits and
approvals for pollution and environmental degradation are made without any public notice,
public input, reasons for the decision and, consequently, no opportunity for independent
review.98
Even where an assessment does occur, it is not clear that the legislative requirements
can produce publicly-justified decisions. For example, the Act’s explicit requirement that the
effects of a project be “justified in the circumstances” cannot, in its current form, amount to
adequate public justification. Public justification requires decisions to be reasonable, i.e.
supported by reasons that reflect the purposes of the legislation and relevant considerations.
The narrow definition of environmental effects renders the Act’s purpose, “to encourage federal
authorities to take actions that promote sustainable development in order to achieve a healthy
environment and a healthy economy” 99 meaningless. A “healthy environment” is one that
includes far more than the highly circumscribed environmental effects defined in the Act.
Moreover, any justification decision is inevitably based on a disproportionate balancing of
economic benefits and environmental harm, where the government (presumably) takes into
account all possible economic benefits100 but only the environmental effects that engage federal
authority. Absent some compelling argument for the differential inclusion of economic and
environmental effects, an environmental assessment decision premised on such a skewed basis
is not reasonable.
Framing CEAA 2012 in rule-of-law terms also reveals that Harper’s process of enacting
new legislation through unprecedentedly large omnibus bills was entirely consistent with the
substance of the new legislation. On one level, the rationale both for the use of omnibus
legislation and the overhaul in environmental assessment was economic stimulus. On another
level, they can both be understood as attempts to undermine the commitment to a democratic
conception of the rule of law. The requirement of public justification sits at the interface
between the rule of law and deliberative democracy. This means that legislators are not only
political actors within a deliberative democracy that generate reasons that they hope their
constituents will accept. They are also legal actors who perform a legal role by putting in motion
a process of lawmaking whereby legal subjects are able to receive the public justification to
which they are entitled. In other words, the legal obligation of legislators is to debate in a way
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that ensures that when government implements that legislation, it is capable of being
implemented in a manner that complies with the requirement of public justification.101
What are the implications of reframing of Harper’s changes to CEAA 2012 in rule-of-law
terms? After all, CEAA 2012 is a legally valid statute even if, as this account argues, it has a
questionable claim to legal authority. Yet, the public-justification conception of the rule of law
imposes positive obligations on those public officials responsible for the administration and
enforcement of the Act. Dyzenhaus writes, of judges:
they must take the legal regime that Parliament has provided and read into it whatever
legal protections they can … because they are working as judges within a legal order,
and not as some other kind of official in some other kind of order; for example, the
order Fuller described as managerial, in which the point of its structures is to make
more efficient the transmission of commands from the top of the hierarchy to the
bottom.102
Such a requirement extends not only to judges but all the legal actors working within the legal
system. This means, for example, that those individuals appointed to conduct panel reviews (the
most rigorous form of environmental assessment) have a legal obligation to justify decisions
that exclude individuals on the basis that they are not “interested parties” under the legislation.
That specific justification would have to reflect the Act’s purpose of “provid[ing] for meaningful
public participation,”103 the information-gathering function of environmental assessment, and
the potentially far-reaching environmental effects of a major development project.
Moreover, public justification requires the courts to play a reason-demanding role when
conducting judicial review. On this view, it is unacceptable for a court to find that a justification
decision under section 52 of CEAA 2012 is reasonable in the absence of any reasons justifying
that decision. 104 In instances where reasons have been offered and they demonstrate the
legislated bias against a comprehensive consideration of environmental effects, then the court
ought to make a clear statement that the decision formally complies with the legislation, but the
legislation undermines the ability of the executive to make publicly justified decisions in
accordance with the rule of law. The effect would be that the decision is legally valid, but much
like in the case of an Act covered by the notwithstanding clause, or a declaration of
incompatibility made under the United Kingdom Human Rights Act, the court has alerted the
public to the legislation’s questionable claim to legal authority.
101
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In sum, this part has argued that environmental assessment is quasi-constitutional in
the sense that it is an indispensible site of public justification in federal environmental decisionmaking. It argued that part of Harper’s legacy, by enacting CEAA 2012, fundamentally
undermined the possibility of publicly justified environmental decisions. CEAA 2012 can
therefore be understood as an attempt, by the Conservative-dominated Parliament, to exempt
environmental decision-making from democratic governance under the rule of law. Finally,
understanding the changes to CEAA 2012 in this way shows how it is possible, and indeed a ruleof-law imperative, for the institutions tasked with implementing and enforcing CEAA 2012 to
interpret the legislation in a way that preserves our commitment to a substantive and
democratic conception of the rule of law.
Conclusion
This article argued that Harper’s legacy in environmental law has been to undermine
environmental protection and publicly-justified environmental decision-making. In conclusion, it
is worth looking ahead to see what of this legacy might survive the next government, which
campaigned on a radically different approach. I offer one prediction and one caution. The
prediction is that we should expect to see a much stronger role for Indigenous environmental
assessments in Canadian environmental law. A significant byproduct of Harper’s environmental
legacy was the galvanization of environmental resistance by Indigenous Canadians through the
Idle No More movement. 105 Moreover, in a direct response to the changes to federal
environmental assessment law, many Indigenous groups have begun to codify and enforce their
own Indigenous environmental assessment laws, which unsurprisingly contain fundamentally
different approaches to environmental assessment.106 The Tsleil-Waututh Nation, for example,
conceives of environmental assessment as a means to discharge responsibility to land and
future generations and to determine the best use of land.107 They call for comprehensive socioecological assessment that eschews any strong division between people and the environment.108
This is a welcome development for Canadian environmental law, but one that undoubtedly
poses further, deeper challenges for intergovernmental cooperation in environmental
assessment, cooperation that has never been fully realized at even the level of provincial-federal
relations.
The caution is that the changes to environmental assessment may not be as easy to
undo as they may seem. Despite the overtness of Harper’s environmental agenda, particularly
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with respect to major projects such as pipelines, many of the legal changes to environmental
assessment are subtler. In addition, these changes are consistent with the well-worn
characterization of environmental assessment as a purely formal and mechanical exercise. A
“streamlined” federal environmental assessment regime is entirely consistent with this
characterization. While the new government has promised environmental assessment reform,109
the stop-gap measures proposed by the Trudeau government for two major interprovincial
pipeline proposals may, in this vein, prove prophetic. These measures create an additional step,
after the CEAA 2012-assessment, in which the government will conduct its own assessment of
the upstream greenhouse gas emissions associated with the pipelines and conduct additional
aboriginal consultation.110 In no way does this address the real problem of CEAA 2012, which is
its inability to generate fair and reasoned decisions. This article suggests that the way for the
Trudeau environmental legacy to supersede Harper’s is to begin by conceiving of environmental
assessment as the linchpin to its commitment to environmental governance under the rule of
law.
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